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WASHINGTON

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME VIII

JANUARY, 1934

NUMBER 3

THE NEW WASHINGTON BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
-RESERVED

POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO CHANGE

The new Washington Domestic and Foreign Corporation Act was
enacted by the State of Washington at the session of its Legislature
convened January 9, and adjourned March 9, 1933.1 The Act was
approved by the Governor on March 21, 1933, and by an express
provision therein became effective on and after January 1, 1934.2
The Act is patterned upon the Uniform Business Corporation Act
and may be cited as such. 3 The history of, and the consideration
given to, the drafting of this Act is treated in a note introductory
to the draft originally submitted to the Legislature, published in
an earlier issue of this LAW RLvIEw

4

Naturally, many and various lines of approach suggest themselves, as the Act in its entirety reflects approximately the entire
law of corporations, and the changes made involve policies and
problems which for an adequate treatment would require volumes
rather than the space allotted here. For example, the new Ohio
Corporation Act enacted in 1927 and amended in 1929 has already
brought forth three leading articles dealing each with one of the
many problems suggested by the Act. Incidentally, it may be
observed that the Ohio Act is in many respects quite similar to the
Uniform Business Corporation Act, in fact, being enacted after
various interchanges of views with the Committee of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.6 Accordingly, the reports. of the
proceedings leading to the enactment of the Ohio Act furnish much
illustrative and enlightening material for the consideration of the
'Wash. Laws of 1933, ch. 185.
2 Section 67.
8 Section 68.
'Uniform Business Corporation Act and The Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, 5 Wash. Law Rev. 170 (1930). TJhe only changes as adopted were
in sections 21 and 28 (V), where instead of the clause "provisions of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act" there was substituted "the laws of this
state." See also handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and Proceedings, 1927, p. 779, and preface to Uniform Business Corporation Act as drafted by the commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association.
r DAvis, "Shares Under the Ohio General Corporation Act," 4 Univ.
Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1930)
DODD, "Amendment of Corporate Articles Under
the New Ohio General Corporation Act," 4 Univ. Cin. L. Rev. 129 (1930)
STrvENs, "Ultra 1ires Transactions Under the New Ohio General Corporation Act," 4 Univ. Cin. L. Rev. 419 (1930).
'See HAnDBOOK OF UiFonm STATE L w Comm SSIoNEas, supra, p. 781.
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Uniform Business Corporation Act.' When, with the foregoing,
one considers the many recent articles concerning corporate problems forming a background for the recently enacted corporation
acts," treating among other subjects the historical development,9
the changing concepts,1 " the reserved power," and the rights of dissenting stockholders,1 2-it
is apparent that it must presently be
desirable to limit this consideration of the Washington Act to a
summary and somewhat more or less clerical treatment. This will
comprise a comparison of the new with the existing law, noting
the changes effected, with occasional comments as to the desirability
of such changes. It is hoped thereby that later articles may be incited with detailed analysis and consideration which will lead to
further improvement in our corporation law
Prefacing this treatment, it is necessary to first consider generally the effect of the new Act upon existing corporations. As to
future corporations organized under the Act, it will in the main
be necessary to note only the changes from the existing law. As
to existing corporations, however, two additional questions are involved first, what provisions of the new Act apply,-a question
of construction, and, second, what power has the Legislature to
make such changes.
Three provisions in the new Act provide for or suggest limitations as to its application to existing corporations. These provisions are as follows:
7 See report of Committees respecting revision of the Ohio Corporation
Law and drafts of acts, December 28, 1926.
8 Particularly the new Ohio and California Acts.
9 See articles by W S. HOLDSWORTH, English Corporation Law in the
16th and 17th Centuries, 31 Yale L. Jour. 382 (1922) SAMUEL WrLiSTON,
History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800," 2 Harv. L.
Rev. 105 (1888), at pp. 111 and 113; DAVIs, Essays in Earlier History of
American Corporations (1917) BERLE, Studies in the Law of Corporation
Finance (1928). Introductory chapter.
1 BERLE, Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance (1928) WORMSER,
Frankenstein Incorporated (1931) BERLE and MEANS, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).
11 See STERN, The Limitations of the Power of a State Under a Reserved Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation, 53 Am. Law
Register I, 73, 145 (1905)
DODD, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 585, 723 (1927) DODD,
Amendment of Corporate Articles Under New Ohio General Corporation
Act, 4 Univ. Cin. L. Rev. 129 (1930) Note, 31 Col. L. Rev. 1163 (1931)
Note, 77 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 256 (1928) Note, 16 Va. L. Rev. 284 (1930
Note, 14 Corn. L. Quar. 85 (1928) BERLE, Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1911) Note, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 413 (1930)
RADZINSKI, Power of the Legislature to Alter, Amend or Repeal Charters
of Private Corporations, 12 Bi-Monthly L. Rev. 127 (1929).
"Note 11, supra. LEvy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 Corn. L. Quar. 420 (1930) LATTiN, Remedies of
Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 233
(1931) RosiNsoN, Dissenting Shareholders: Their Right to Dividends
and the Valuation of Their Shares, 32 Col. L. Rev. 60 (1932). The foregoing represent recent leading articles, with extensive citations for a lead
in the pursuit of questions sugested.
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SE T oN 61. Except where otherwise expressly stated
heretn, this Act shall be applicable to any existing corporation formed under the general incorporation laws of
this state for a purpose or purposes for which a corporation might be formed under this Act.
SEc oN 62. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
SEcTIoN 63. This Act shall not impair or affect any
act done, offense committed or right accruing, accrued
or acquired, or liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment
incurred prior to the time this Act takes effect, but the
same may be enjoyed, asserted, enforced, prosecuted or
inflicted, as fully and to the same extent as if this Act
had not been passed.
SE T oN 61 provides for the application of the new Act to existing corporations. Note that the only exception here made is where
"otherwise expressly stated" in the Act. SEcTIoN 62, repealing Acts
inconsistent with the new Act, obviously will change its application
to existing corporations so far as they are dependent on the existent
inconsistent statutes. SECTIoN 63 is the saving clause.
It will be interesting to note the comments of the committee
which drafted the Ono Corporation Act on corresponding sections. 3 With respect to the section of their Act relating to application to existing corporations, which is similar to SEcTiON 61,
supra,they say
"Existing corporations which. continue to exercise their
franchise will automatically come under and be subject
to this Act. All statutory proceedings or action of such
corporations must be taken and done in accordance with
this Act. The rights of shareholders, as between themselves, as expressed in existing articles of incorporation
or in preferred stock, are, of course, saved by the saving
clause. "
With respect to the section providing a saving clause, which is
identical with SEcTION 63, supra, they say
"This section is taken from the New York General Corporation Law (Section 17, L. 1923, ch. 732) It is the belief of the committee that this carefully phrased clause
more effectively covers all of the rights, liabilities and
interests than any saving clause which has come to its
attention."
Notwithstanding this statement the rights protected by the
saving clause are not defined. The state may exercise its
police power'14 and we still have to reckon with the reserved
See note 7, supra, pp. 148, 149.
"The Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat, 518 (U. S. 1819) holding that
the charter of a corporation is a contract, has no application to the exer6ise of the police power for the health, safety, and general welfare of the
community, since these are incidents of sovereignty which the state cannot
release. Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 25 (1878).
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power clause, whereby the Legislature is empowered to alter
amend, or repeal all laws pertaining to corporations. The rights
contemplated by the statute may be those involved between the
state and the corporation alone, may be those involved between
the corporation and shareholders, may be those involved among
the shareholders alone, or may be those which while primarily between the state and the corporation evidently affect the shareholders.15 In fact, it may be questioned whether, any reserved power,
if exercised, does not affect shareholders' prior rights.16 It is generally conceded that the state may make changes designed for the
benefit and protection of the public, and it is submitted that such
regulations would apply to existing as well as to future corporations. It may also be urged as a matter of principle with some
supporting authority that intra corporate regulations, and even
matters mnter sese among shareholders, are in many instances of
such public concern that they may be similarly considered. 17 If so,
the interests of uniformity in the administration of the law, and
the necessity for advantageous competition of existing corporations
with corporations formed under the new Act, would seem to require
that in all cases unless clearly inapplicable because of their nature,
'r Mr. Cades writes to this effect in a note in 77 Umv. Pa. L. Rev. 256
(1928) at p. 258: "When the power is reserved by the state to repeal,
alter or amend it is clear that some of the amenities of the association
are destroyed, but that there still remains some limitation on the power
of the state to amend the corporatin laws. The effect of such a reservation
of power by the state on the immunity from impairment of the relations
of the shareholders inter se is not clear. Many authorities seem to proceed on the theory that the creation of the relations as to shareholders
inter se is a matter separate and distinct from the creation of the relations between the corporation and the state, and that therefore the state
may not directly alter any of the relations of the shareholders inter se.
Other authorities would seem to lend color to an opposed theory. According to the latter view, all the terms of the agreement between shareholders, as to the management of the corporation and as to their interest
in the corporation, are conditions upon which the state grants the privilege of corporate existence. The reserved power gives the state the
absolute power to withhold or alter this privilege." He continues, "No
case carries this theory to its logical conclusion." (Authorities cited.)
"-'Mr. Fuller in a note in 14 Corn. L. Quar. 85 (1928) at p. 86 says:
"It is argued, therefore, that under the reserved power, the state can
change only the rights existing between the corporation and the state,
and cannot alter rights of the shareholders inter sese. This reasoning
has not been strictly followed and many amendments have been upheld
that do seem to affect rights existing between the shareholders themselves. This is a result of the theory that the shareholders have impliedly
consented to amendment by becoming members of a corporation whose
contract with the state they knew was subject to the state's reserved
power to amend. Furthermore, it is difficult for us to see how the state
could, in any case alter a charter without in some way effecting a change
in the original plan of the shareholders. The courts' answer to these
arguments is that an amendment is constitutional if it does not work
a fundamental change in the nature of the liu-siffess or infringe on vested
rights." (Authorities cited.)
11See Note, 31 Col. L. Rev. 1163 (1931) Note, 16 Va. L. Rev. 282 (1930)
DODD, Amendment of Corporate Articles under the New Ohio General
Corporation Act, 4 Univ. Cin. L. Rev. 129 (1930), at pp. 156, 157.
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or because of interference with vested rights or property interests,
the provisions of the new Act should apply What rights of shareholders will be protected and are therefore not subject to the new
Act, is still a matter of some doubt. As the saving clause undertakes
no specific recital of these rights, it is safe to say that they will
be determined as a matter of judicial decision, and as their determination is so closely allied with that power of the state to change
the law, further discussion will be deferred to the consideration of
that question.
The Dartmouth College Case18 was decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1819. This case held that the charter
granted was a contract within the meaning of the Constitution of
the United States declaring that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. It has since been questioned
whether a charter is a contract between the state and either the
corporation or incorporators. 9 It is certainly not within the modern concept of a contract. It is also questioned whether it is even
a franchise, it being urged that under our present general corporation laws it is to be conceived of merely as a group of natural persons voluntarily associated under a contract for the conduct of
business, regulated by statute.2 0 It is not within the scope of this
article to discuss these questions, but they are relevant to the
determination of the power of the state to alter, amend, or repeal
the corporate charters or laws relating to corporations.
Notwithstanding the doubts expressed as to the soundness of the
decision expressed in the Dartmout. College Case, the Supreme
Court of the United States has adhered to it in later cases. The
states, alarmed at the possibility of private corporations becoming
uncontrolled, either through their constitutions, statutes, or articles,
reserved the power to alter, amend, and repeal. The Constitution
of the State of Washington provides that.
"All laws relating to corporations may be altered,
amended, or repealed by the Legislature at any time, and
all corporations doing business in this state may, as to
such business, be regulated, limited, or restrained by law."
Just what was intended to be covered by this clause has been
questioned. 21 It is contended that the state can change only the

11Trustees of Dartmouth college v. Woodward, note 14, supra. See
BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, (1st Ed., 1927), at pp. 809, 811.
see BALLANTn,
PRIVATE ConPonA0IoNs, (1st Ed., 1927), at p. 810;
DOE, A New View of the Dartmouth College Case, 6 Harv. L. Rev. 161
(1892)
DODD, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate
Charters, 75 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 585 (1927) at pp. 593-595.
"See note 19, supra. Also see DODD, Dogma and Practice in the Law
of Associations, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 977 (1929).
See notes 15 and 16, supra. BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATONS (1st
Ed., 1927), chapter XXI.
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rights existing between the state and the corporation, and cannot
alter the rights of the shareholders inter sese. It is so contended
both from the viewpoint that the Legislature in making a reservation intended only to reserve the power to amend its own grant,
and that it could not apply to the contract between the corporation
and shareholders, as this would impair the contractual relation of
the stockholders snter sese. While this view has received some support, it has not been generally followed. 22 It is argued that many
provisions concerning the internal management of corporations are
of public interest and are conditions to the exercise of the corporate franchise, again the stockholders may be said to have consented to the modifications of their agreements by becoming members of a corporation whose contract with the state they knew was
subject to the state's reserved power to amend.
There is considerable confusion in the authorities not only in
traditional formulae but in a failure to appreciate the nature of
the rights and interests concerned. It is quite commonly stated that
no fundamental change can be made in the natuxe of the business,
again that voting rights may not be changed, and still again that
property interests may not be affected with or without compensation. It may first be noted that many changes that are enacted
might well come under the police power;2-3 that changes where
there is compensation are in their nature at least similar to the
exercise of eminent domain ;24 that the consent to be implied in the
reserved power to make changes is that which would undoubtedly be
protected by equitable limitations.2 5 Any change, even though limited to the contract between the state and incorporators, to a cer' 2 This Is the contention of Judge Stern m his article cited in note 11,
supra. For cases supporting this view see Note, 77 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 256
(1928), note 12.
"See Note, 31 Col. L. Rev. 1163 (1931) at p. 1164, where it is stated
that: "Most changes imposed by the states in the relationship between
the corporation and the general public have been of the same nature
as those enacted under the police power. When the wisdom of some restraint on the state's right of alteration under the reserved power apappeared, the same tests of due process were applied. The reserved power
and the police power tend, therefore, insofar as changes affecting the
general public are concerned, to coalesce. Virtually all of the regulations
justified by the courts under the reserved power might well have been
sustained under the police power without reference to the additional
control over corporations. (Cases cited.)" See also, DODD, Amendment of
Corporate Articles under the New Ohio General Corporation Act, 4 Univ.
Cin. L. Rev. 129 (1930), at pp. 154-157.
See Note, 14 Corn. L. Quar. 85 (1928) at 88, where Mr. Fuller states
that: "Furthermore, since there is intimation in the cases that there
is an element of public interest involved, this element of public interest
plus compensation to reduce the rigor of its effect, might be treated as
validating such amendments as a sort of eminent domain." DODD, Amendment of Corporate Articles under the New Ohio General Corporation Act
(1930), at page 164.
BEaLE, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049
(1931) at p. 1066, Note, 77 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 256 (1928).
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tam extent'affects the rights inter se among the shareholders. The
interest of the state in the corporation of today should perhaps not
be limited to the contract interests as involved among a small group
of shareholders. It has been urged that the private corporation
has become an institution. 26 The exercise of the police powers is
ever developing, and the state's interest in this so-called institution
may be that which should be .exercised either as a police power
or through powers analogous to the exercise of eminent domain.
Equitable limitations suggest that the reserve power of the corporation to amend its charter must be so exercised that the result
will tend to benefit the corporation as a whole, and that the benefit
or sacrifice shall be distributed between the shareholders or classes
proportionately or ratably at least as their interests appear. If
not, and one must sacrifice at the expense of another, there should
be compensation, the justification for which will be found in the
benefit to the corporation as a whole, in turn justified by the interest of the state in the welfare of the corporation as a matter of
public concern. Difficulties, however, will continue to be encountered until there is a recognition of the distinction between the
policies involved in -treating with a closed corporation, composed
of a few individuals, and a large corporation, composed of an
investing, general public, who are primarily interested from an investment standpoint.
Briefly summarizing, the-traditional objections to the exercise of
the reserved power are that the obligation in the contract of the
shareholders mnter sese is impaired, that these are matters in which
the state is not concerned, and that the due process clause protects
the property rights which include arbitrary discrimination. On
the other hand, it is stated that by the reservation clause the state
has expressly reserved the right to regulate and control the corporation as a matter of public concern, that having created the
corporation, it has the authority to make such changes as it sees
fit, that the shareholders have impliedly consented to the reservation and the exercise of reasonable powers thereunder, that in any
event if the powers exercised are for the general welfare of the
corporation they may be justified as an extension of the police
power, or if provision is necessitated for compensation they may be
justified as analogous to the exercise of eminent domain. In any
'

See

BERLE and

MEANS,

THE MODERN CORPORATIONq AND PRIVATE PROP-

(1932). The authors assert that the American corporation has ceased
to be a private business device, and has become an institution. Professor
Robert S. Stevens in a recent book review, 18 Corn. L. Quar. 634 (1933),
states that this volume is the most comprehensive and illuminating exposition of the modern corporate system that has been published. See also
DODD, Amendment of Corporate Articles under the New Ohio General
Corporation Act, 4 Univ. Cin. L. Rev. 129 (1930), at pp. 130, 131.
ERTY
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event, a study of the decisions will show an increasing tendency
to recognize the reserve power. One writer states that the vested
right has varied directly with the practical importance of the interest destroyed by the alteration, and inversely with the advantage
of a change.2 7 It is a safe observation that so far as the reserve
powers exercised are not arbitrary, are essential to the welfare of
the corporation, and substantially protect the interests of the
parties concerned, that the courts will find reasons to justify such
powers when exercised. It is submitted that the powers exercised
in the new Washington Act will be sustained.
In the following treatment the sections of the Act as adopted
in Washington will be considered in turn. No attempt has been
made to exhaust the authorities either in the State of Washington
28
or elsewhere.
SECTION 1 deals with definitions. These conform to general usage
except that it should be noted Subsection 7 provides that a "subscriber becomes a shareholder upon the allotment of shares to him,"
and Subsection 9 provides that " 'allotment' means the apportioning of a certain number of shares to a subscriber in response to
the application contained in his subscription, or to a shareholder
pursuant to the declaration of a stock dividend. The allotment of
shares to the incorporators, or to persons whose subscriptions were
approved by the incorporators before incorporation and were unrevoked at the time of incorporation, shall be considered automatically coincident with incorporation." It will be seen that the controversial question of when a subscriber becomes a shareholder is
settled, being fixed as of the time of allotment of shares without
the necessity of notice or other acceptance, and that as to subscriptions prior to incorporation, the allotment is automatically coincident with the incorporation. Subsection 10 in deflinng capital stock
of a corporation makes this term definite and specifically includes
the aggregate of cash, and value of any other consideration rendered as payment of allotted shares having no par value. This
should be contrasted with the prior existing statute which in
providing for the reduction of capital stock excludes so much of
the capital stock as is represented by non par value stock. This
will be considered subsequently under Section 40 of the new Act
relating to the reduction of capital stock.
SECTION 2 deals with the purpose of incorporation and the qualifications of incorporators. The new Act requires "three or more
See Note, 31 Col. L. Rev. 1163 (1931).
The sections of the Washington Act are for the greater part identical with the sections of the Uniform Business Corporation Act. The
explanatory notes of the commissioners follow many of the sections. See
Vol. 9, Uniform Laws Annotated, p. 27 et sequa.

CORPORATION ACT
natural persons of full age, at least two-thirds of whom are citizens
of the United States or its territories." The minimum number of
incorporators under the old act was two. The specific recital of
the qualifications suggests their recital in the articles of incor29
poration.
SECTIoN 3 provides for the articles of incorporation. These
changes should be noted.
(1) Acknowledgement by three of the incorporators instead of all,
(2) The name must include abbreviation "Inc." or "Corporation" or "Incorporated" or "Company" or abbreviation "Co." If "Company" or "Co" are used,
the word or the abbreviation must not be inmediately
preceded by the word "and" or the abbreviation
(3) The duration may be permanent instead of being limited to fifty years,
(4) The post office address is required of the registered
office instead of the location of the principal place of
business,
(5) A statement is required as to the authorized number
of par value shares and the par value of each share,
and if any of these shares have no par value, the
authorized number of such shares as contrasted with
the former law which required the statement as to the
amount of its capital stock, or if non par value, the
amount of its initial non par capital.
(6) A description of the classes of shares, the number in
each class, and their relative rights, voting power,
preferences, and restrictions, as contrasted with no
requirement under the previous statute,
(7) The paid in capital with which the corporation will
begin business. There was no such provision under the
old law,
(8) The first directors with their post office addresses with
no fixed term of office. Under the old law post office
addresses were not required, while the term of office
was limited from two to six months,
(9) The post office address of the incorporators and a
statement of the number of shares subscribed by each
which shall not be less than one and the class of
sharep for which each subscribed. The prior law contamed no such requirement.
The substantial rather than the formal changes to be noted in
the foregoing are those requiring the articles to set forth the
classes and restrictions of shares mentioned in (6), supra. This
calls for a financial plan of the corporation prior to the filing of
the articles, unless it is to be accomplished later by amendment.
O'BRYAN and OwENs, WASHNGToN FR
n

BooK (1st Ed., 1932), p. 949.
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The other substantial change is in (9), supra, requiring the incorporators to be subscribers, and to state the number of shares
subscribed by each.
SECTION 4 provides limitations for the use of the corporate name.
The right of the legislature to change the corporate name has been
passed upon in this State, at least when being exercised for the
protection of the public.30 The provision in Subsection 1 requiring
new corporations to include the abbreviations "Inc." or "Co.",
or the words "Corporation" or "Incorporated" is clearly an exercise of such power. It is expressly provided that this subsection
shall not apply to existing corporations. Subsection 2 prohibits
the use of deceptively similar names and does not change the exisiting law It provides that a corporation about to change its
name or ceasing to do business may consent to the use of a deceptively similar name."' Subsections 3 and 4 are new provisions
providing for protection of names for corporations to be filed in
the future. Subsection 8 provides expressly that the unlawful
assumption of a corporate name shall not vitiate corporate existence, and that notwithstanding the issue of the certificate of
incorporation, the use of an unlawful name may be collaterally
attacked. It may be observed that this section does not change the
former law, which permits the adoption of the name of a delin2
quent corporation.
SECTION 5 requires that the triplicate originals of the articles
of incorporation shall be delivered to the Secretary of State. An
endorsement of his approval is to be placed on each, one is to be
retained and recorded, the other two are to be returned to the
incorporators, one to be filed for record in the office of the auditor,
the other to be retained by the corporation. Upon approval of the
articles and the payment of all costs, the Secretary of State will
issue a certificate of incorporation, and upon its issue the corporate existence begins. Outside of the procedural changes necessitated by the expressed policy of insuring authentic articles, this
section is important in that it definitely fixes the time of the beginning of corporate existence. It also provides that upon the
issuance of the certificate of incorporation, prior subscribers become shareholders. 8
SECTION 6 deals with subscriptions for shares before incorporation. It provides that such subscriptions shall be irrevocable for
1 Unon Trust Co. v. L. H. Moore, 104 Wash. 50, 175 Pac. 565 (1918).
31This conforms with the practice of the Secretary of State, although
there was a technical difficulty as long as the former corporation law
exists.

"' See Wash. Rem. Rev Stats., 1933, sec. 3847.
" See 9 Uniform Laws Annotated, p. 48. Commissioners' notes.
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a period of one year except upon such grounds as will permit the
rescission of any contract. It further provides that such subscriptions shall be revocable after one year unless prior to such revocation a certificate of incorporation is issued. Subscriptions for
shares may be enforced according to their terms, and when no provision as to the time of payment is made, the shares shall be paid
for on the call of the board of directors. The provision making
these subscriptions irrevocable except for fraud, duress, or undue
influence in their procurement, settles an irreconcilable conflict of
authority and changes the former law of this State. The new
provision seems desirable as in accord with public interest that
the new corporation should have as resources enforceable subscriptions if fairly obtained.
SECTION 7 provides that the minimum amount of "paid-rn"
capital with which a corporation may begin business shall not be
less than $500.00.
SECTION 8 imposes certain conditions precedent to the beginmng
of business and provides a penalty for their violation. These conditions are: (a)filing the articles for record in the office of the
county auditor; (b) the payment to the corporation of the "paidin" capital with which it may begin business, and (c) the filing
with the county auditor of an affidavit by a majority of the directors, stating the amount of "paid-in" capital with which it will
commence business and that it has actually been paid to the corporation. To insure compliance with these conditions, it is further
provided that the officers and directors who fail to dissent if any
of these conditions are violated shall be liable for the debts or
liabilities arising therefrom. The penalty will protect the creditors
m the event of noncompliance. This section definit 9 ly establishes
the requirements mentioned as conditions precedent to beginning
business rather than as conditions precedent to corporate existence.
It should be noted that Subsection 1 by implication permits debts
and transaction of business incidental, and therefore prior to the
organization of the corporation, or the obtaining of subscriptions,
or the payment for shares.3 4
SECTION 9 provides that the certificate of incorporation issued

by the Secretary of State shall be conclusive evidence of the fact
"'The promoters of a corporation are personally liable upon contracts
made by them before incorporation, and by the weight of authority for
services and expenses in the organization of a corporation. Some states
held the corporation liable for services and expenses necessarily incurred
in its organization, but the weight of authority requires definite approval
by the corporation after its organization unless such liability is imposed
by its charter or by general law. BAL.r rnm, CoaroRATioxs (1st Ed.),
1927, secs. 47a and 48. The implication in subsec. I suggests the necessity for an express understanding providing for the liability for such
charges.
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of incorporation, but that the State may dissolve corporations
which should not have been formed under the. Act, or shall have
been formed without compliance with prescribed conditions precedent to incorporation. This section does not alter the present law
by which the State may question corporate existence when conditions precedent to incorporation have not been substantially complied with. On the other hand, it does change the law with respect
to de facto existence by prescribing that the certificate Issued by
the Secretary of State shall be conclusive. This will settle a controversial and much litigated question. 5 It does not necessarily
provide an exclusive test and still leaves room for the question of
a corporation by estoppel.
SECTION 10 specifies the purpose and effect of filing or recording
papers required to be filed. It provides that the purpose is to
afford the public the opportunity of acquiring knowledge of the
contents of such papers, but that no person dealing with the corporation shall be charged with constructive notice thereof. It will
be seen that this provision is for the protection of the public rather
than for the protection of the shareholders. Filing as constructive
notice was occasionally resorted to for the purpose of showing an
ultra vires contract.
SECTION 11 distinguishes corporate capacity from corporate
authority and provides specifically certain powers that every corporation shall possess. It provides in Subsection 1 that the corporation shall have the capacity to act possessed by natural persons.
In so doing, it recognizes the difference between power and right
to act, and makes the law speak the truth, for a corporation can
commit an unauthorized act. This should do away with much of
the confusion heretofore existing because of the reluctance of
some courts to recognize this fact. It abolishes the limited corporate capacity doctrine and makes room for the development of
a general capacity doctrine based upon the principles of the laws
of agency 36 This provision, with Section 10 supra which abolishes
the doctrine of constructive notice, will remove the two sources of
greatest confusion in the ultra vires cases.
The corporate powers enumerated in Subsection 2 are those that
are essential or usually essential to the conduct of business by any
corporation. They conform quite generally with the law elsewhere,
and with the law of this State except that paragraph "b" of tins
subsection permits perpetual existence. Our law has heretofore
limited corporate existence to fifty years. Some question may be
'See

tated 52.
'See

extensive note by Commissioners in 9 Uniform Laws Anno9 Uniform Laws Annotated, pp. 57-62, Commissioners' notes.
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raised as to the extension of charters when their time of existence
is once fixed, 87 although the power was expressly conferred by a
former act of our legislature, and seems never to have been
questioned.
SECTION 12 provides for holding shares and securities of other
corporations. It is in accord with our present law.
SEcTioN 13 provides that the shares of a corporation may be
divided into classes with such rights, voting power, preferences
and restrictions as may be provided for in the articles of incorporation. The only stock provided by former statutes of this State inelude par, non par, common, and preferred stock.3 8 The only provision made for different classes was in the preferred stock, and apparently only preferred stock could be issued with limited or no
voting power.3 9 The new section seems desirable in permitting greater variation in the form of investment and enterprise. On the other
hand, sufficient protection seems to be afforded to the investor by
the various information required to be filed or recorded, the fiduciary obligation placed upon the management, and the notice directly afforded the purchaser of such shares, apprising him of the terms
0
and exact nature of his investment.
SECTION 14 outlines information required to be specified in the
stock certificate and provides for the issue of share warrants. The
total number of the authorized par value and.non par value shares,
and the rights, voting powers, preferences and restrictions granted
to or imposed upon the shares of each class and a summary thereof
with reference to the articles of incorporation when more than one
class is issued must be stated in the certificate. The intent and
purpose of such provisions are obvious. It should be noted that
shares cannot be listed on the New York stock exchange unless
the "certificates of every class recite the preferences of all classes."
Subsection 4 provides for the issue of share warrants pursuant to
the resolution of the board of directors.
SECTION 15 provides for the allotment of shares and their consideration. Subscriptions for shares having a par value shall be
" Art. 12, Sec. 5, of the Constitution of the State of Washington provides that: "The legislature shall not extend any franchise or charter,
nor remit the forfeiture of any franclse or charter of any corporation
now existing, or which shall hereafter exist under the laws of this state."
As this provision by its terms applies only to the extension of charters,
it contemplates, if anything, charters with a fixed term of duration and
will not apply to charters having a perpetual existence. It is interesting
to note that Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats. of 1933, sec. 3805, provides that,
"It the articles of incorporation of any corporation state a time of existence less than fifty years, its time of existence may be extended by
amendment but not beyond a period of fifty years from the date of its
incorporation." This statute seems never to have been questioned.
Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats. of 1933, sec. 3805 and sec. 3812.
Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats. of 1933, sec. 3812.
,oThese provisions will be discussed under the appropriate sections.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
paid for either with cash or with other consideration at a fair
valuation. Subscriptions for shares having no par value if signed
before incorporation shall be paid for as determined by the incorporators, if signed after incorporation, they shall be paid for
as determined by the shareholders or by the board of directors
under authority conferred by the shareholders or articles.
SECTION 16 provides that certificates of stock shall not be issued
until the shares represented thereby have been fully paid for. This
applies also to shares allotted as stock dividends. A note or uncertified check will not be deemed payment until the note or cheek
has been paid. This section will obviously do away with the many
problems heretofore arising by reason of the transfer of stock which
had not been paid for.
SECTION 17 provides for the valuation of consideration for
shares. The valuation placed by the incorporators, the shareholders, or the directors, as the case may be, upon consideration
other than cash will be conclusive as to the obligation of the shareholder to the corporation. The same is true with respect to surplus
transferred to capital as payment for shares allotted as stock dividends. This does not contemplate an arbitrary valuation. Subsection 4 of article 20 snfra expressly reserves rights of any person
under the common law or principle of equity against an incorporator, subscriber, shareholder, director, officer or the corporation
because of any fraud practiced upon him.
SECTION 18 provides for the filing of a report with an affidavit
as to the consideration received or to be received m payment for
shares allotted. It also provides the penalty for failure to file.
Such reports, duly verified, must be filed within thirty days after
incorporation and additional reports must be filed within ninety
days after every subsequent allotment of shares and must contain
a statement of the number of shares allotted to the date of the
report, an accurate, detailed and itemized description of the consideration received or to be received for the same, and a statement of the valuation upon any consideration other than cash received or to be received in payment. The purpose of this section
undoubtedly is to afford those interested the opportunity not only
to ascertain the stated capital stock but to scrutinize the consideration which actually entered into its make-up. While it is somewhat doubtful whether creditors actually do rely upon the capital
stock of a corporation, this provision at least affords them a reasonable opportunity to judge the value of the assets if they so
desire. The fact that notice is given those who are interested in
securing the same, perhaps justifies the provision in Sectwn 17
that the valuation placed upon the consideration shall be conclu-
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sive. The severity of the penalty provided should secure strict
compliance. 41
SE T oN 19 is to the effect that shares allotted m violation of, or
without full compliance with the provisions of the Act, shall not
make the shares so allotted invalid. Some question may be raised
as to whether this provision is advisable where an allotment of
shares is made in excess of the number authorized by the articles.
It may well be contended that tbis will vary the contract rights
of the existing shareholders, and that the balance of convenience
will be better served by restricting the holder of such shares to
an action for damages against the corporation. Such has been the
law in the similar situation where the corporation has reissued
shares upon the surrender of a forged certificate and these shares
4
have come into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. i*
LESLIE J

AYER.**

' This is one of the most important requirements in the new act. A
similar requirement in the Ohio Act was recommended as one of the
outstanding merits of that act. It is believed that the law should concentrate the attention of the creditor upon the actual assets and refuse
to support a supposed reliance upon the aggregate par value. See commissioner's note, 9 Uniform Laws Annotated, pp. 70, 71. COOK, "Water
Stock"-Commissions--"Blue Sky Laws"-Stock Withut Par Value, 19
Mich. L. Rev. 583 (1921).
,2 BALLATINE, CORPORATIONS (1st Ed.), 1927, sec. 151.
*To be continued.
**Professor of Law, University of Washington.

